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RECENT CASE NOTES
been to abandon entirely the criteria of governmental or proprietary distinc-
tions, and to apply to municipal corporations the same rules of tort liability
as are applied to other legal entities.2 7
The Indiana case2 8 here in point discusses neither governmental nor
corporate functions, completely ignoring such distinctions, and premises lia-
bility, if any, solely on negligence. This is an entirely different premise from
that of the old theory, and seems to be in accord with the new definite trend
in the direction of tort liability for municipal corporations. F. L. M.
DAMAmEs-MENTAL ANGUIsH.-Plaintiff contracted with defendant, an
undertaker, to prepare for burial and to bury plaintiff's minor daughter. As
part of the contract for which defendant was compensated, the defendant
promised to have a photograph made of the deceased daughter before burial.
Defendant knew that plaintiff had no picture of his daughter and knew plain-
tiff's purpose in having one made. Defendant negligently allowed the body to.
be buried without having the photograph made. Plaintiff stated these facts
in his complaint, seeking to recover for mental anguish occasioned by the
breach of contract. A demurrer to this complaint was sustained by the lower
court. Plaintiff assigned error. Held: affirmed. A contract action cannot be
maintained for mental anguish alone.1
Damages for emotional disturbance as distinguished from punitive damages
are compensatory in nature and, when awarded, they are given as a matter
of right.2 No general rule has ever been devised which will satisfactorily
reconcile all the cases where the problem of recovery or non-recovery of
damages for mental suffering is presented. No difficulty is experienced where
there has been an invasion of the plaintiff's personal physical integrity, and
the resulting mental pain and suffering is a proximate consequence. 3 This is
true irrespective of the intentional or negligent character of the defendant's
conduct. Nor is there much conflict in the authorities where such elements
of damages are allowed as compensation for a mental injury suffered from
a wilful tortious act, especially in those cases where the wrong affects the
liberty,4 character,5 reputation,6 privacy,7 or domestic relations8 of the injured
party. If the defendant acted with the intention of causing mental suffering,
2 7 Workman v. Mayor of City of New York (1900), 79 U. S. 552, 21 S. Ct.
212; Kaufman v. Tallahassee (1922), 84 Fla. 634-, 94 So. 697, 30 A. L. R. 471;
Evans v. Berry (1933), 62 N. Y. 160, 186 N. E. 203; Williams v. Jacksonville
(1935), 118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15, 98 A. L. R. 513.
28 Supra, Note 1.
IPlummer v. Hollis (1937, Supreme Ct. of Indiana), 11 N. E. (2d) 140.
2 State Ex Rel. Scoby v. Stevens (1885), 103 Ind. 55, 2 N. E. 214.
3 Cox v. Vanderbleed (1863), 21 Ind. 164.
4 Harness v. Steele (1902), 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875 (Action for false
imprisonment).5 Leach v. Leach (1895, Tex. C. A.), 33 S. W. 703 (Rape).
6 90 A. L. R. 1175-1200 (Where the defamation is not actionable per se,
no recovery can be had for mental suffering unless other injury or damages
are proved).
7 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. (1905), 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68.
8 Pickle v. Page (1930), 252 N. Y. 475, 169 N. E. 650.
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most courts allow recovery even if such elements of damage are the only ones
present.9
In the field of actions ex contractu there seems to be no rhyme nor reason
to the decisions respecting the granting or disallowance of compensation for
injuries to the feelings. Actions for damages for breach of contract to marry
are repeatedly cited as the one exception to the general rule that damages for
mental suffering are not recoverable for a mere breach of contract. This
unquestionably states the majority viewpoint, especially if the subject matter
of the contract is merely of a pecuniary nature.1 0
A growing minority of jurisdictions, either as a result of judicial decision
or by statute,1 1 allow recovery for mental suffering in a contract action if the
nature of the contract is such that a breach thereof would naturally cause
grief and distress of mind.12 The so-called "telegraph cases" where the
telegraph company fails or delays in delivering, or erroneously transmits a
message and the recipient as a consequence is subjected to mental anguish
are the most representative of the cases supporting the minority rule.1 3
Definite limitations, however, are put on the ability to recover. Mental suffer-
ing must be the direct and natural result of the breach. The defendant must
have full knowledge of the facts-the peculiar condition and circumstance of
the promisee.1 4 Mere disappointment, embarrassment, vexation, or regret is
not sufficient.' 5 Further, if the contract was "purely and simply a business
one," recovery is not allowed.16
Indiana at one time was definitely committed to the minority rule, but all
the previous cases were overruled in 1901.17 The instant case refers to the
decision rendered in that year as unqualifiedly settling the law in Indiana.
9 Kline v. Kline (1902), 158 Ind. 602, 64 N. E. 9. (Assault) ; Great A. &
P. Tea Co. v. Roch (1931), 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (Plf. ordered loaf of
bread from defendant. Defendant put a dead rat in a package and sent it
to plaintiff); La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty (1934), 126 Neb. 457, 253
N. W. 424 (Threats to appeal to one's employer, made wilfully and intention-
ally for the purpose of producing mental pain and suffering in attempting
to collect a debt).
10 Many of the pertinent cases are reviewed in Western U. Teleg. Co. v.
Choteau (1911), 28 Okla. 664, 115 P. 879.
11 The minority rule has been adopted by legislative enactment in Arkansas
(Crawford & Moses, Digest, Sec. 10249), Florida (Comp. Gen. L., 1927, Sec.
6352), Oklahoma (Comp. St. 1921, Sec. 4951), South Carolina (Code, 1932,
Vol. III, See. 8553), Wisconsin (Stats., 1929, sec. 180.19), Louisiana (Civil
Code of Louisiana, 1825, art. 1928).
12 Western v. Olathe State Bank (1925), 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pa. 689 (Bank
broke a contract to furnish plaintiff credit for a trip to another state by
refusing to honor his checks after he got there) ; Loy v. Reid (1914), 11 Ala.
App. 231, 65 So. 855 (Defendant breached his contract to embalm properly
the body of plaintiff's child: held, plaintiff entitled to damages for mental
anguish suffered because of the decomposition of the body prior to burial).
13 So. Relle v. Western U. Teleg. Co. (1881), 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep.
805 (This case was the "mother" of all the succeeding cases). See 26
R. C. L. 606.
14 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Goodwin (1914, Tex. C. A.), 173 S. W. 1164.
15 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Finbrach (1916, Tex. C. A.), 191 S. W. 191.16 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Melvin (1917), 175 Ky. 480, 194 S. W. 563.
17 Reese v. Western U. Teleg. Co. (1890), 123 Ind. 294, 24 N. E. 163
(Adopted the doctrine of the So. Relle Case). In accord: Renihan v. Wright(1890), 125 Ind. 563, 25 N. E. 822 (breach by an undertaker of his contract
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Even the jurisdictions which deny compensation for mental suffering re-
sulting from a breach of contract permit recovery for such injuries in an
action where the defendant is a common carrier, or an innkeeper whose
servants have insulted or abused the plaintiff who was a passenger or guest.18
The true basis for these decisions, however, is the breach of a public calling
duty, and the action sounds as much in tort as contract. Those jurisdictions,
also, allow recovery of mental anguish damages against the proprietor of a
public resort (not a public calling) for publicly ejecting a patron.' 9 It seems
that the prospects for recovery of mental anguish in these cases vary in direct
proportion to the number of people who would probably be witnesses to the
ejection.
Certain objections are frequently put forward to denying recovery for
mental suffering. First, there is said to be no legally recognized interest in
being free from emotional disturbance, the invasion of which will support an
independent cause of action. It is maintained that such damages are merely
parasitic and can be awarded only in connection with a wrong which apart
from such mental suffering constitutes a cause of action. One can readily see
that this is merely stating a conclusion of law rather than a reason for the
disallowance. Moreover, the argument is fallacious in that in many tort
actions damages for injured feelings are the only damages recovered. Even
if it were necessary to have such a peg on which to hang recovery, it appears
that a breach of contract would be substantial enough. Second, it is said that
such damages are too remote. This, too, has but superficial validity. The
amount of consequential damages recoverable in an action of contract depends
upon what was in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
was made.2 0 If the promisor had notice of the consequences of a breach,
then this requirement is satisfied. Therefore it can hardly be said that the
damages were too remote in such cases as the instant one where the very
purpose of the contract was to appease the feelings of the promisee. Any
thinking person could have foreseen the injuries which the plaintiff would
sustain if the contract were not performed. Third, it is argued that such
damages are too speculative and difficult to ascertain. This objection loses
all of its force when one considers the many situations where the same thing
might be said in reference to the attempt to value the loss of an eye in personal
injury cases, or the loss of property which has no market value. The risk of
the jury's awarding more than a sufficient amount as compensation for the
plaintiff's injury should be one attendant on the wrongdoer's act, instead of
with next of kin to keep safely a corpse until the next of kin thereof desired
to inter the same). However, these two cases were overruled by Western U.
Teleg. Co. v. Ferguson (1901), 157 Ind. 64, 60 N. E. 674, 54 L. R. A. 846
which adopted the majority rule.
18 Indiana R. Co. v. Orr (1907), 41 Ind. App. 426, 84 N. E. 32 (Con-
ductor gave plaintiff the wrong transfer, and she was subsequently ejected
from another street car of defendant's line); Kolo and Sullivan v. Win. Penn
Hotel Co. (1926), 86 Pa. Super. Ct. 359 (servant of the inn disturbed plaintiff
in her room).
19 Aaron v. Ward (1911), 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (ejection from a
public bath house); Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher (1909, Ky. C. A.), 119 S. W.
195 (plaintiff expelled from theatre); Smith v. Leo (1895), 22 Hun. 242, 36
N. Y. Supp. 949 (expelled from dance hall).
20 McKibben v. Pierce (1917, Tex. C. A.), 190 S. W. 1149.
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being the basis for denying the injured party any recovery a. all. Fourth,
the objection is made that it would be necessary to use a subjective test and
to inquire into the state of mind of the plaintiff. But is not this just what is
being done in defamation cases where express malice has to be discovered in
order to defeat a qualified privilege, or in fraud cases in proving scienter?
Fifth, the most powerful and frequently reiterated argument is that to allow
recovery for mental anguish in an independent action would open a regular
'Tandora's box of evils" inasmuch as there would be a deluge of litigation.
To state this objection is no more than an admission of incapacity on the part
of the courts to dispose of the cases as they arise. There is here an implied
recognition that a wrong has been suffered for which compensation should be
made, but justice is not done merely because of the court's desire to make
their work of administration less difficult.
The very fact that an increasing number of courts and legislatures are
advocating the allowance of damages for mental suffering as an independent
cause of action conclusively shows that the fears of those courts which deny
such damages are not justified. In view of the complexity of modern society
and the development and increased interest of humanity in more refined modes
of living, the boast of the common law that there is a remedy afforded for
every wrong should not be an idle one. Blind and arbitrary adherence to
precedent should not defeat a rule for which both reason and natural justice
are eloquent advocates. 2 1  J. M. C.
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS-SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-Action
by the successor of a reorganized bank upon a note executed by defendant
corporation. Defendant claims the right to set off against its obligation a
deposit credit maintained in the defunct bank by a subsidiary corporation.
The subsidiary had established the account by resolution of its own board of
directors, and withdrawal powers were confined to five officers of the sub-
sidiary. However, the same five individuals were the controlling officers of
the parent corporation. Moreover, the bank was frequently given reports of
financial condition by the parent corporation, and in these reports the sub-
sidiary was regarded as a mere division. Practically the management was
the same, but the formalities of separate management were observed. Held,
defendant is not entitled to set off the deposit credit of its subsidiary against
its own indebtedness. 1
The relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations causes con-
siderable difficulty in the law. 2 Although for most purposes the two corpora-
21 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton (Ind. App., 1938), 12 N. E. (2nd) 360-
decided subsequently to the instant case allowed recovery for mental anguish
alone, resulting from the defendant's wilfully making an unauthorized autopsy
of the body of plaintiff's husband. The language used by the court is suf-
ficiently broad to be in conflict with the decision in the principal case-
"Mental suffering need not be accompanied by physical injury where the act
. resulted in the invasion of the legal rights of another." However,
this is mere dictum because recovery was granted on the grounds pointed
out above-Note 8.
1 Feucht v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Ind. App. 1938), 12 N. E. (2d) 1019.
2For discussion of the general problem, see: Powell, Parent and Sub-
sidiary Corporations (1931); Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability
